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In addition to the articles found in this issue of Court Review,which present the considered views of the authors on vari-ous subjects, we also seek to stimulate the thinking of the
reader regarding judicial independence.  For those attending
the annual conference of the American Judges Association this
year, this will involve review of the materials in this issue and
interchange with authors of the articles and a number of others
who have given substantial thought to the topic—as well as
interchange with other judges in attendance.
For those whose involvement with the National Forum on
Judicial Independence will come only through the pages of
Court Review, in this issue and the next, we provide in the next
few pages some materials that we hope will give you pause and
stimulate your thinking.  There are two distinct types of mate-
rials included.  We are indebted to Professor Peter M. Shane of
Ohio State University, who has given permission to include sev-
eral of the hypothetical problems on judicial independence that
he presented to the U.S. Conference of Chief Justices at its 2001
midyear meeting.  In addition, from a variety of sources, I have
culled the views on judicial independence of a number of
thinkers.  Interspersed within the views of others I have
included some of my own comments.  
HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEMS ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Let us begin, then, with the hypothetical problems pre-
sented by Professor Shane.  We note, also, that the sixth hypo-
thetical was contributed to Professor Shane by Stewart Jay, pro-
fessor of law at the University of Washington School of Law.
On decisional independence:
1. An East Carolina District (i.e., trial) Court judge has issued
an injunction against the state’s current system of financing
its public schools through property taxes.  While the case is
on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the House majority leader
declares on the floor of the House: “The judiciary has
requested $50 million to upgrade court facilities and tech-
nology and to improve judicial pay.  If the Supreme Court
ultimately affirms the challenge to property tax-based pub-
lic school financing, they will not see a dime of the budget
they have requested.” Is this appropriate?  Would it be any
more or less appropriate for the House majority leader to
convey the same message privately to the Chief Justice?
2. East Carolina’s District Court has issued an injunction
requiring a series of administrative and facilities improve-
ments in the state system of publicly funded mental hospi-
tals.  While the case is pending on appeal, the House of
Representatives schedules a committee hearing on the men-
tal hospital system and requests that both the District Court
judge and the Chief Justice of the East Carolina Supreme
Court testify.  Should they?
3. The Constitution of the state of East Carolina provides that
Supreme Court Justices “shall be liable to impeachment for
high crimes or misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office.”
During the past year, the court has decided two highly con-
troversial cases.  In the first, the court invalidated a state law
prohibiting the distribution of birth control information and
supplies to minors without parental consent or notification.
The court based its decision on the “right of privacy” under
the East Carolina Constitution.  In the second, the court
upheld a custody award to the divorced husband of a woman
managing partner at a major law firm on the ground that the
lower court properly took account of the time demands of
the mother’s job.  Outraged conservative legislators have
demanded the impeachment of the justice who wrote the
birth control opinion, while outraged liberal legislators have
demanded the impeachment of the justice who wrote the
custody opinion.  Is either demand proper?
4. East Carolina Supreme Court Justice Nicole Green con-
curred last year without opinion in a unanimous opinion
vacating a death sentence based on procedural error in the
sentencing hearing.  During her retention election, a con-
servative radio talk show host has galvanized a campaign
against Justice Green on the ground that she is “leading the
anti-death penalty charge” in East Carolina.  The Governor,
facing a tough reelection campaign next year, has publicly
expressed his doubts about any justice who would “deny the
people of East Carolina the benefit of the ultimate penalty
for a heinous capital crime.”  How should Justice Green, the
judiciary, or the organized bar respond?
5. Fred Bundy has been convicted and sentenced to death for
an especially heinous killing of a police officer.  The case
against him is overwhelming on the facts.  But his court-
appointed lawyer was observed at trial sleeping through por-
tions of the testimony of key witnesses.  He failed to bring
out on cross that one of the witnesses against Bundy had
been convicted of fraud.  Also, although Bundy’s trial venue
was probably the most conservative county in East Carolina,
the defense attorney wore a “Gay Rights” button on the first
day of trial.  On appeal, a three-judge panel of the state’s
intermediate appellate court voted 2-1 to uphold his convic-
tion.  The dissenting judge, Lonnie Brown, would have
ordered a retrial on the ground of ineffective assistance of
counsel.  (As a general matter, Judge Brown has voted to
affirm criminal convictions in 90% of the cases he has heard
on appeal and in 78% of the cases involving death sen-
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tences.)  Unlike Judge Brown, his opponent in his next re-
election campaign is a multimillionaire with virtually
unlimited resources for advertising.  The opponent’s ads
show a male hand unlocking a jail door and allowing the
inmate, a scruffy and malevolent looking fellow, to walk out
smirking.  A voice says: “Judge Lonnie Brown is soft on
crime.  If it had been up to Judge Brown, Fred Bundy would
be a free man today.”  How should Judge Brown, the judi-
ciary, or the organized bar respond?
On institutional independence:
6. Reacting to complaints from the public and the bar about
the tardiness of certain trial judges in completing cases, the
state enacts a law to encourage speedier dispositions.  The
Commission on Judicial Administration is charged with set-
ting general timetables for disposing of various matters
(e.g., motions for summary judgment/dismissal, post-trial
motions, issuing findings of fact/conclusions of law, render-
ing final judgments).  Each trial judge in the state is
required to keep a record of the time spent on these matters
in every case.  These records are reported to the
Commission on an annual basis.  The Commission is
required (1) to publish a “report card” (using such labels as
“completes work on time” or “takes substantially longer
than other judges to decide cases”) to be included in a
Voters’ Guide whenever any sitting judge seeks reelection,
and (2) to impose penalties (measured as a portion of the
judge’s salary) if the judge exceeds the time limits by certain
percentages, i.e., the slower the disposition, the higher the
penalty.
The state constitution provides, “The judges of the
Supreme Court and judges of the superior courts shall sev-
erally and at stated times, during their continuance in
office, receive for their services the salaries prescribed by
law therefor, which shall not be increased after their elec-
tion, nor during the term for which they shall have been
elected.”  The constitution also states: “Each cause submit-
ted to a judge of a superior court for his or her decision shall
be decided by such judge within 90 days from the submis-
sion thereof; Provided, that, if within said period of 90 days,
a rehearing shall have been ordered, then the period within
which the judge shall decide shall commence at the time the
cause is submitted upon such a hearing.”  Are the new
statute’s provisions appropriate responses to judicial tardi-
ness?
7. East Carolina’s Senate Committee on the State Judiciary
sends a questionnaire to the presiding judge of each state
court and to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  The
questionnaire seeks not only case management statistics for
each court as a whole, but also the following statistics for
each judge:
a. Number of opinions assigned
b. Number of opinions written
c. Average number of days
between case argument
and announcement of
decision
d. Cases still pending for
decision for 30 days or
less, for 30-90 days, for
90-180 days, and for
more than 180 days
e. Hours per week on non-
court related profes-
sional activity, including a list of all such activities
f. Hours per week on non-case related travel, including
documentation of the expenses for all such travel; and
g. For each appellate judge, the number of votes to affirm
lower court judgments and the number of votes to
reverse.
Are all of these inquiries appropriate?  How should the
courts respond?
8. The East Carolina Court of Appeals hears appeals as a mat-
ter of right from virtually all state district court cases.  The
nine judges have a screening system.  If a screening panel of
three judges agrees (a) that a case does not require oral
argument before resolution, and (b) on the proper disposi-
tion of the case, then the case is resolved entirely on the
briefs.  Approximately 40% of the court’s caseload is han-
dled this way.  The court also has a “summary affirmance”
process that permits lower court opinions to be affirmed
without a written statement of reasons.  About a quarter of
the cases screened and about 10% of the cases decided after
oral argument are summarily affirmed.  The East Carolina
Constitution expressly authorizes the state legislature to
enact procedures for all courts below the Supreme Court.
The legislature is considering a bill that would require the
Court of Appeals to permit oral argument in all cases and to
decide each case based upon a written opinion stating the
court’s reasons for affirmance or reversal.  The legislation
does not contemplate the creation of new judgeships.  How
should the state judiciary respond?
VIEWS ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The excerpts to follow from several sources are intended to
advance one’s thinking about the concepts raised in consider-
ing judicial independence.  After one of them, I have included
my own comments (marked as “Editor’s Note”).
John Adams’ view on judicial independence, according to
David McCullough’s recent biography:  Essential to the stability
of government and to an “able and impartial administration of
justice” is separation of judicial power from both the legislative
and executive.  There must be an independent judiciary.  “Men
of experience on the laws, of exemplary morals, invincible
patience, unruffled calmness and indefatigable application”
should be “subservient to none” and appointed for life.1
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James Madison saw indepen-
dence for judges as a protec-
tion against legislative and
executive oppression, but in
1789, on the floor of the
House of Representatives
when he was proposing the
Bill of Rights, he added this:
“[I]ndependent tribunals of
justice will consider them-
selves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bul-
wark against every assumption of power in the legislative or
executive.”2
The States’ treatment of judicial independence varied. The
“founding generation was ambivalent about the independence
of the judiciary.” The nature of this ambivalence was the ten-
sion between competing values.  On the one hand, an impar-
tial, independent judiciary was viewed as a necessary protec-
tion of the rights of the people.  On the other hand, a truly
independent judiciary would conflict with the principle of
majority rule.3
Felix Frankfurter, in the 1951 case of Dennis v. United States:
“But how are competing interests to be assessed?  . . . .   [W]ho
is to make the adjustment? — Who is to balance the relevant
factors and ascertain which interest is in the circumstances to
prevail?  Full responsibility for the choice cannot be given to
the courts. Courts are not representative bodies. They are not
designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society. Their
judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable,
within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment,
founded on independence. History teaches that the indepen-
dence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become
embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary
responsibility in choosing between competing political, eco-
nomic and social pressures.”4
Otto Kaus, who served on the California Supreme Court from
1980 through 1985, described memorably the dilemma of
deciding controversial cases while facing reelection.  He said it
was like finding a crocodile in your bathtub when you go in to
shave in the morning.  “You know it’s there, and you try not to
think about it, but it’s hard to think about much else while
you’re shaving.”5 He said this in 1985, the year before Chief
Justice Rose Bird was denied retention, along with (and
because of) two of her colleagues.  
Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., a North Carolina lawyer who served as
president of the American Bar Association in 2002-2003:
“Judicial independence is precious to our way of life. Judicial
independence is a fundamental principle upon which our
country was founded and for which Americans have died, not
only at Yorktown and Valley Forge, but at the Alamo, Iwo Jima,
Inchon, Khe Sanh, and, now, Mazar-E-Sharif.”6 
The majority in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White7
held that a provision of the Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct, which said candidates for judicial office, including
incumbents, could not “announce his or her views on disputed
legal or political issues” violated the First Amendment.  That
Code provision, called the “announce clause,” was in effect in
only 7 other states at the time of the White decision.  Most
other states with codes based on the American Bar
Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct had since
adopted different, more narrow restrictions.8 From the major-
ity opinion:
“One meaning of ‘impartiality’ in the judicial context—
and of course its root meaning—is the lack of bias for or
against either party to the proceeding. Impartiality in this
sense assures equal application of the law. . . .
“We think it plain that the announce clause is not nar-
rowly tailored to serve impartiality (or the appearance of
impartiality) in this sense. Indeed, the clause is barely tai-
lored to serve that interest at all, inasmuch as it does not
restrict speech for or against particular parties, but rather
speech for or against particular issues. To be sure, when a
case arises that turns on a legal issue    on which the judge
(as a candidate) had taken a particular stand, the party
taking the opposite stand is likely to lose. But not because
of any bias against that party, or favoritism toward the
other party.  Any party taking that position is just as likely
to lose. The judge is applying the law (as he sees it) even-
handedly.
“It is perhaps possible to use the term ‘impartiality’ in
the judicial context (though this is certainly not a com-
mon usage) to mean lack of preconception in favor of or
against a particular legal view. This sort of impartiality
would be concerned, not with guaranteeing litigants equal
application of the law, but rather with guaranteeing them
an equal chance to persuade the court on the legal points
in their case. Impartiality in this sense may well be an
interest served by the announce clause, but it is not a com-
pelling state interest, as strict scrutiny requires. A judge’s
lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues
in a case has never been thought a necessary component
of equal justice, and with good reason. For one thing, it is
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virtually impossible to find a judge who does not have
preconceptions about the law.  . . . .  Indeed, even if it were
possible to select judges who did not have preconceived
views on legal issues, it would hardly be desirable to do
so. ‘Proof that a Justice’s mind at the time he joined the
Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitu-
tional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualifi-
cation, not lack of bias.’
“A third possible meaning of ‘impartiality’ (again not a
common one)  might be described as openmindedness.
This quality in a judge demands, not that he have no pre-
conceptions on legal issues, but that he be willing to con-
sider views that oppose his preconceptions, and remain
open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending
case. This sort of impartiality seeks to guarantee each lit-
igant, not an equal chance to win the legal points in the
case, but at least some chance of doing so. It may well be
that impartiality in this sense, and the appearance of it,
are desirable in the judiciary, but we need not pursue that
inquiry, since we do not believe the Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted the announce clause for that purpose. . . . . 
“The short of the matter is this: In Minnesota, a candi-
date for judicial office may not say ‘I think it is constitu-
tional for the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages.’
He may say the very same thing, however, up until the
very day before he declares himself a candidate, and may
say it repeatedly  (until litigation is pending) after he is
elected. As a means of pursuing the objective of open-
mindedness that respondents now articulate, the
announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as to ren-
der belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous.”9
Editor’s Note: The discussion of bias and impartiality in the
Court’s decision in White would have benefited from remem-
bering the thoughts of Justice Cardozo, and Kenneth Culp
Davis who, like Scalia, taught administrative law.  Cardozo
wrote that judges are shaped in part by “the likes and dislikes,
the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts
and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man
. . . .  The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men
do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by.”10
Davis, meanwhile, explained the meaning of bias:
“The concept of ‘bias’ has at least five meanings.
Although the five kinds of bias shade into each other, the
main ideas about bias in adjudication may be stated in five
sentences, each of which deals with one kind of bias: (1)
A prejudgment or point of view about a question of law or
policy, even if so tenaciously held as to suggest a closed
mind, is not, without more, a disqualification. [As the great
Ad Law professor Louis Jaffe  wrote: “Our tradition rightly
understood is that a judge shall be neutral toward the
question of whether a specific defendant is guilty. It is a
perversion of the tradition
to demand that the judge
be neutral to the purposes
of the law.”] (2) Similarly,
a prejudgment about leg-
islative facts that help
answer a question of law
or policy is not, without
more, a disqualification.
(3) Advance knowledge of
adjudicative facts that are
in issue is not alone a dis-
qualification for finding
those facts, but a prior
commitment may be.  (4)
A personal bias or personal prejudice, that is an attitude
toward a person, as distinguished from an attitude about
an issue, is a disqualification when it is strong enough and
when the bias has an unofficial source; such partiality may
be either animosity or favoritism.  (5) One who stands to
gain or lose by a decision either way has an interest that
may disqualify if the gain or loss to the decisionmaker
flows fairly directly from her decision.”11
*   *   *   *
The remaining excerpts (except for the last two at end) are
from a book that followed a 2001 conference on judicial inde-
pendence at University of Pennsylvania Law School, sponsored
by the American Judicature Society and the Brennan Center for
Justice at New York University.  The book opened with these
comments from Stephen B. Burbank, Barry Friedman, and
Deborah Goldberg:
“Believing that the debate about judicial independence
has produced more heat than light and that scholars in
different disciplines have been talking past one another,
we convened a conference of some 30 prominent acade-
mics with backgrounds spanning four disciplines to dis-
cuss what we know, and ought to know, about judicial
independence.  . . . .
“At the core of the conference sat the puzzle of exactly
what we mean—or could possibly mean—by the phrase
‘judicial independence.’ ‘Independent from what?’ was a
typical reaction, and every bit of common wisdom on the
subject was challenged. For example, . . . the common
intuition of the participants was that wholly unaccount-
able judges are as likely to deviate from what the law
might demand as follow it.  Thus, some amount of
accountability seems essential to ensure judicial adher-
ence to popularly specified legal norms and therein lies a
dilemma. . . .
“An important insight emerged from the conference
repeatedly:  Policy debates and academic research about
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the judiciary should separate
high—or  constitutional—
courts from other courts . . . .
According to the traditional
view, trial and intermediate
appellate courts deal with the
gritty facts of ordinary cases.
It is here, specifically, that we
seek decisions rendered on
those facts free of any outside
influence.  High courts and
constitutional courts, by contrast, are more likely to deal
with broad questions of public policy.  Although we may
want those judgments rendered in a forum different from
that of ordinary politics, we may not want them entirely
immune from democratic accountability.”12
Edward L Rubin, a law professor at the University of
Pennsylvania law school, wrote:
“[Let us clarify] the distinction between independence
and neutrality, a separate matter that is frequently con-
flated with it.  Decision makers are neutral if they are
indifferent about the consequences of their decisions;
decision makers are independent if they are not affected
by any signal from another actor.  An umpire for a base-
ball game is neutral if he or she does not care which team
wins the game; he or she is independent if no one on the
field or in the stands can influence his or her calls.  The
two considerations can operate separately, although they
often occur in conjunction. For example, the umpire has
lost both neutrality and independence if one team offers a
bribe to decide in its favor, but only neutrality is lost, and
not independence, if he or she has bet on one team.
Racist judges are perfectly independent; no signal from
any other actor induces them to decide against minority
group litigants. They are entirely self-motivated.  
“Neutrality is not even desirable in most governmental
situations because we generally want public officials to
care about the results of their actions.  What is undesir-
able, and what we attempt to prevent, are decisions based
on personal gain or on factors that we deem to be irrele-
vant. . . .  
“[W]e are not concerned if a judge’s decision will
improve his or her position, financial or otherwise, as a
member of the general public.  As critical legal studies,
feminist, and critical race theory scholars have pointed
out, public decision makers often act, or can be seen as
acting, to improve the status of their own social class, gen-
der, or race, but our concept of required neutrality does
not reach these effects. Similarly, prejudice against an
individual or group may be considered a forbidden breach
of neutrality by the decision maker if that attitude is
deemed irrelevant by law or public morals.  It is currently
considered improper for a public official to explicitly dis-
favor blacks or Jews, but this was not true with respect to
blacks in early 19th century America, nor with respect to
Jews in medieval Europe, and it is currently not improper
for officials to express distaste for criminals.  But our con-
cept of neutrality only reaches outright and explicit prej-
udice; the collection of attitudes that every individual
possesses is regarded as too complex and obscure to serve
as the basis of a legal rule . . . .  In general, neutrality,
although an important concept, is a limited one, and
reaches only extreme situations such as a direct financial
interest in the outcome, or an explicitly and strongly
stated prejudice that is deemed legally improper. . . .
“[N]eutrality is a practical standard only in the most
extreme situations because attitudes and judgments are
ubiquitous. Politics is similarly ubiquitous and no gen-
eral prohibition of it, however defined, can constitute a
coherent standard.”13
Stephen B. Burbank, an administration of justice professor at
the University of Pennsylvania, Barry Friedman, a law profes-
sor at the New York University School of Law, and Deborah
Goldberg, a scholar with the Brennan Center for Justice,
wrote:
“[D]iscussions of judicial independence often proceed
on the erroneous premise, stated or unstated, that judicial
independence and judicial accountability are discrete con-
cepts at war with each other, when in fact they are com-
plementary concepts that can and should be regarded as
allies.  This supposed dichotomy between independence
and accountability is a favorite target of legal scholars in
search of a paradox . . . . The instrumental view of judicial
independence urged here, on the other hand, requires no
dichotomy and sees no paradox, because it proceeds from
the premise that judicial independence and judicial
accountability are different sides of the same coin. . . .
“No rational politician, and probably no sensible per-
son, would want courts to enjoy complete decisional
independence, by which we mean freedom to decide a
case as the court sees fit without any constraint, exoge-
nous or endogenous, actual or prospective.  Courts are
institutions run by human beings. Human beings are sub-
ject to selfish or venal motives, and even moral paragons
differ in the quality of their mental faculties and in their
capacity for judgment and wisdom. In a society that did
not invest judges with divine guidance (or its equivalent),
the decision would not be made to submit disputes for
resolution to courts that were wholly unaccountable for
their decisions.  One implication of this proposition is
that we need law to constrain judges rather than judges to
serve the rule of law.”14
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Lewis A. Kornhauser, an economist and law professor at the
New York University School of Law, wrote:  
“First, the judge should only be free of ‘inappropriate’
influence. Second, and related, the judge need not be free
of the influence of all individuals. The parties may influ-
ence a judge through legal arguments that persuade
judges and that are offered orally in court or in papers
submitted to the court; such persuasion does not consti-
tute ‘inappropriate’ influence. Arguments offered ex parte
might be inappropriate though we may not characterize
the exercise of this sort of influence as compromising
judicial independence. Similarly, judges who take bribes
are subject to inappropriate influence. Neither lower
court judges who follow the decisions of superior courts
nor state supreme court justices who are persuaded by the
rulings of courts outside their jurisdiction are subject to
inappropriate influence. Most important, judges who ren-
der judgment on the basis of commitment to some set of
moral and political principles are not subject to inappro-
priate influence.15
“The concept of judicial independence does not further
the development of normative theories of adjudication,
does not advance understanding of the functioning of
extant judicial systems, and does not aid in the design (or
improvement) of judicial institutions. . . .
“The concept of judicial independence is not useful.
Legal debates over adjudication, debates over the design
of judicial institutions, and the explanation of the emer-
gence and performance of various judicial institutions
would be clearer and progress more rapidly if we aban-
doned the concept.”16
Mark Twain, who needs no title, wrote:  
“Man is the only animal that blushes.  Or needs to.”
Stephen B. Burbank, Barry Friedman, and Deborah
Goldberg again: 
“Perhaps the most important and least understood
aspect of judicial independence is the relationship
between public opinion and judicial decision making. . . .
Do judges cater to, or are they even aware of, public opin-
ion?  And does the public watch and react to what judges
do? In the common wisdom of judicial independence, the
answer to the first question ought to be no but the second
regrettably is yes.  As it turns out, this may be exactly
backward. What evidence there is suggests that a remark-
able number of high-profile decisions comport with pub-
lic opinion.  At the same time, it seems the public has very
little clue what the judiciary is up to.  This juxtaposition
of results presents serious normative questions about
whether judges are paying too much attention to public
opinion and whether the public is paying too little atten-
tion to what judges are
doing.  It also presents a real
set of questions about how
the public forms its opinion
of judges.”17
Edward L. Rubin again:     
“[I]ndependence is not
an inherent feature of the
judiciary, either as a descrip-
tive or a normative matter.
Rather, it is a technique of
governance that is widely
deployed in a modern state
and that serves a variety of
functions.  The question, therefore, is entirely open.
Should the judiciary be independent and if so, to what
extent?  . . . .18
“[I]n important cases, in which major issues of public
policy are at stake, . . .signals [transmitted to the court by
nonjudicial governmental units or by private parties] are
deemed acceptable because these signals are understood
to relate to the case’s implications, not to the fate of the
particular individuals who are before the court.  The
extreme version of this is public interest litigation.  In
Brown v. Board of Education, few people really cared where
Linda Brown went to school; the issue was American
apartheid and thus people felt as free to express their
views about the case as they did when the same issue
came before Congress in the debate over the Civil Rights
Act.19
“The prohibition of . . . signals to the judiciary applies
only to decisions in specific cases, however, and not to
signals about the judiciary’s general performance.  It is
considered acceptable for public officials to transmit
informative signals and expressive signals to the judiciary;
for example, a legislator can provide information to the
judiciary about the extent of medical malpractice and
condemn the judiciary for being too lenient with defen-
dant physicians, or he or she can note the number of
offenders on probation who commit additional offenses,
or issue a public condemnation of the frequency with
which the judiciary grants probation. Similarly, it would
be considered quite proper to condemn the general per-
formance of a particular state’s judiciary as reflecting
racial prejudice and to document that condemnation with
statistics about the differential treatment of the races in
question.  Such statements are part of our accepted polit-
ical discourse; the judiciary’s performance is a matter of
public concern, and non-judicial officials are entitled to
speak to such matters, whether or not they have a direct
role in the selection of judges. . . .20
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“Thus far, only the adjudi-
catory function of the judi-
ciary has been considered.
Although this certainly con-
stitutes the bulk of the judi-
ciary’s role, it does not consti-
tute the entirety. Courts are
assigned a variety of other
tasks that vary in content
from one American jurisdic-
tion to another. . . .  Consider,
for example, the federal judi-
ciary’s role in drafting the
Rules of Civil Procedure. By
statutory authorization, the chief justice of the United
States appoints an advisory committee to develop the ini-
tial draft. This draft, if approved by the advisory commit-
tee and two intermediate bodies, is submitted to the
Court, which has authority to revise it. . . .21
“This point is underscored by the much more exten-
sive independence that is granted to the Federal Reserve
Board in carrying out its monetary control function. At
present, the Fed controls the money supply—the amount
of cash, check-able accounts, and certain other assets
available in the nation—by buying and selling govern-
ment securities on the open market. . . . To begin with, the
governors of the Federal Reserve System, who constitute
a significant portion of the Open Market Committee, are
appointed to 14-year terms and can be removed only for
cause; other members of the committee are civil service
employees with similar levels of protection. . . .22
“Still another example of the way that the mechanism
of independence can be used for nonadjudicatory deci-
sions that implicate efficiency, not fairness, is the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.  The end of
the Cold War, the change in defense strategy by military
analysts, and the effort to balance the federal budget
brought an awareness that the United States had an exces-
sive number of military bases and that a significant num-
ber should be closed. But most bases are economic main-
stays of the community where they are located, a phe-
nomenon that has very little to do with the base’s military
necessity. Legislators often win or lose elections based on
their ability to secure or retain such valuable economic
assets for their constituents; thus, any effort to close mil-
itary bases runs into determined opposition from the
affected state’s delegation, the classic pork barrel scenario
that ends up sacrificing public interest to particularized
benefits.  Congress enacted the Base Closure Act to pre-
vent itself from succumbing to these political pressures,
the image of Ulysses lashing himself to the mast as he
passes the Sirens being an inevitable metaphor. . . .
“[I]ndependence is not always linked to fairness, any
more than it is linked to the judiciary. It is not a necessary
aspect of our efforts to provide fairness to groups, for
example.  On the other hand, independence is often a
mechanism that is deployed to achieve other goals, such
as efficiency.  Control of the money supply is a function in
which efficiency considerations have suggested that the
decision maker should be granted a very high level of
independence, one that is virtually as extensive as that
granted to adjudicators, and perhaps greater in certain
ways. The same considerations have led to the creation
of other agencies with lesser, but still significant levels, of
independence such as the FTC and the FCC.  These uses
of independence have nothing particular to do with fair-
ness or with the judiciary. . . .23
“Elections are a different matter.  Although it is not
possible for the electorate, as a body, to transmit an infor-
mative signal to a judge—how would a general mass of
citizens give the judge any persuasive information about a
particular case—it can certainly transmit an expressive
signal.  Such signals can be extremely influential, whether
the judge must stand for reelection after a term of years or
is subject to periodic or ad hoc recall.  Consider, in our
current tough-on-crime environment, a judge who feels
that the case against a person who is probably guilty of a
heinous crime should be dismissed because the crucial
evidence was illegally obtained, or a judge who wants to
sentence a whole category of youthful offenders to alter-
native sentences, knowing that at least one of these
offenders will probably commit a serious crime at some
time in the future.  Or consider a judge in the pre-World
War II South who feels that a black man accused of rap-
ing a white woman should receive an acquittal notwith-
standing the verdict because the evidence was insuffi-
cient. To these dramatic examples may be added the
more frequent case of the judge whose ordinary decisions
incrementally produce a general impression that he or she
is soft on Communism, soft on crime, or soft on any other
issue on which the public wants him or her to be hard.
Not only are these expressive signals likely to be influen-
tial, but there is probably no informal norm against trans-
mitting them and they are impossible to prohibit.  Public
officials may be forbidden or discouraged from expressing
opinions about judicial performance as part of the under-
stood obligations of their government position.  But there
is no practical way to prohibit the general public from
expressing such opinions, and it would probably violate
the First Amendment even to try.           
“Thus, the problem with elected judges is not the oft-
stated one that it politicizes the judicial role. Any method
of selection will do that and, besides, the role is inherently
political by virtue of the judge’s attitudes.  The real prob-
lem is that an electoral regime inevitably exposes judges
to expressive signals from the general public.  The strong
influences that result could deny fair adjudications to
individuals who are potentially subject to disadvantages.
Perhaps it would go too far to assert that judicial elections
violate the due process clause, given the long history of
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this mechanism and the traditional nature of due process,
at least with respect to civil trials.  But these influences do
indicate that judicial elections violate our general sense of
fairness and should be abolished as a matter of policy.       
“A second institutional question involves salary and
resources protection.  Here again, many states depart from
the federal baseline.  To begin with, salary protection is
found in only a minority of states, a situation that some
would rank with elected judges as a major risk to judicial
independence.  But microanalysis suggests that salary pro-
tection may not be as critical as is sometimes assumed.  Of
course, lowering a specific judge’s salary would constitute
a powerful signal to that person, but the process is too
cumbersome to be used with respect to an individual deci-
sion, and civil service rules would generally preclude its
use with respect to the general pattern of decisions by an
individual judge. By and large, salary reductions can
only be imposed on the judiciary as a whole.  As such, it
is an extremely crude means of sending signals and it is
not necessarily an effective one.  It is certainly possible to
construct a scenario in which the legislature or chief exec-
utive punishes a judiciary whose decisions antagonize the
public, but the actualization of this scenario is a bit more
difficult to envision.  An elected official who interfered
with the decisions of the judiciary in such an obvious
fashion might be taking a greater political risk than one
who tolerated the judiciary’s unpopular stance. Moreover,
the judiciary’s response, when confronted in such an obvi-
ous manner, might well be recalcitrance, particularly if
the salary reduction were only a modest one, which
would probably be the case. 
“On the other hand, a mere proposal to reduce judicial
salaries might serve as an expressive signal by the legisla-
ture or the chief executive.  But it is questionable whether
we really intend to forbid such signals. Although there
are strong norms against expressive signals from public
officials regarding the outcome of a particular case, there
are no such norms against expressions of general disap-
proval, as noted above.  There are, moreover, valid reasons
to grant elected officials the authority to reduce judicial
salaries.  Such salaries represent a higher proportion of
state and local budgets than of the federal budget; if all
government salaries are being reduced as part of a general
economy effort, excluding judicial salaries might be bur-
densome.”24
Terri Jennings Peretti, a political science professor at Santa
Clara University in Santa Clara, California, wrote:
“Judicial independence is considered to be a norm of
vital importance in our legal system. Its goal is in ‘law-
based’ decision making by judges . . . .  Because the peo-
ple can be confident that judges made their decisions
fairly and objectively, compliance with court rulings is
thereby assured.  High regard
for courts continues, as then
does their legitimacy, power,
and unique ability to protect
our treasured rights and liber-
ties.
“I am tempted to refer to this
collection of claims as ‘the judi-
cial independence myth.’  This
is due to its proponents’ ten-
dency to present judicial inde-
pendence as fact rather than as
an ideal or set of normative values about courts.  As this
suggests, I am rather dubious about the existence of judi-
cial independence. Unlike many scholars, however, I am
not particularly troubled by this state of affairs. . . .
Whether one’s goal is to protect judicial independence or
to limit it, social science research regarding courts has
much to offer and is ignored at the reformer’s peril.25
“Research shows that, at least with regard to the U.S.
Supreme Court, none of these claims is valid. In fact,
compliance with the Court’s rulings is uneven, public
awareness and understandings of them are minimal, and
public evaluations are neither exceptionally high nor
rooted in beliefs about the Court’s impartiality. . . .  The
modest public support that exists for the Court appears
not to be dependent on a belief in its neutrality or inde-
pendence. Instead, scholars agree that the dynamics of
public support for the Court ‘bear a remarkable resem-
blance to those for Congress and the presidency.’
Research reveals that public approval of the Court, at
both the individual and the aggregate level, is strongly
tied to ideology, with evaluations dependent on political
agreement with the substance of the Court’s decisions.”26
Charles M. Cameron, a political science professor at
Columbia University in New York City, wrote:
“[O]ne can meaningfully examine the relationship
between [features like life tenure and protected salaries]
and the operational fact of independence (or the lack
thereof.)  For example, [researchers Eli Salzberger and
Paul Fenn] show that judges on the English Court of
Appeals who consistently take antigovernment positions
are less likely to be promoted to the Judicial Committee
of the House of Lords, the highest judicial venue in
England, than lord justices of appeal who are less anti-
government.  Similarly, [Mark Ramsmeyer and Eric
Rasmusen] show that antigovernment judges in Japan
suffer less successful and less pleasant careers than do
pro government judges.  The resulting incentive systems
no doubt discourage antigovernment behavior by
judges—which is to say, they diminish judicial indepen-
dence from the government.”27
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30. The charges were:  He attended and participated in a regular
meeting of the Ocala Republican Women’s Club and of the
Republican Club of Sumter County; attended and campaigned for
his election at a “Salute to Labor” picnic and Democratic candi-
date rally; his wife attended, with his knowledge, and partici-
pated on his behalf in the Lake County Federated Women
Republican’s “Meet the Candidate Night” (she assumed the oppo-
nent had been invited, but the opponent had not been invited and
was not present); he attended a partisan political gathering to
support a Republican candidate for the House of Representatives,
to which the opponent was not invited.  Also, when asked about
his political party affiliation, he identified himself as a member of
a partisan political party. 
Kim Lane Scheppele, profes-
sor of law and sociology at the
University of Pennyslvania,
wrote:
“Imagine World A [where
a statute, creating a clear
exception to a prior law, is
appropriately applied by a
judge to a case within the
exception’s reach.]
“Now imagine World B
where (a) the general statute
enacted in the appropriate way covers a range of cases,
including Case X.  But (b) the head of the governing
political party who is also (not coincidentally) the head
of the government (perhaps as the president or the prime
minister) calls the judge to say that, in Case X, an excep-
tion should be made to the usual rule to reach an out-
come different from the one that the general statute
would usually require.  Let us further suppose that this
political official is (c) generally authorized to be the law-
maker in this particular regime because the official has
the power to issue binding legal decrees but (d) this par-
ticular instruction in the particular case is not given in
the form of a decree but instead through a phone call that
the judge and the politician both know is supposed to be
kept secret.  In World B, unlike World A, the outcome in
the one specific case is dictated directly by the caller
without reference to a legal norm.  But let us suppose that
the judge in World B, like the judge in World A, does as
instructed; Case X, which has specific political interest to
the regime, is handled as an exception to the general rule.
In World B, I submit, the judge has no independence and
no moral credit left because the judge has caved in to
direct political pressure.
“But what exactly is the difference between World A
and World B? In both worlds, the result is the same.  This
one particular case that came before the judge has been
lifted out of the general run of cases to which a broader,
more general rule applies and it has been handled as an
exception.  Moreover, it was the specific instructions
from someone in political power that determined what
happened in both cases.  In World A, however, the
instructions came in the form of legislation and in World
B, the instructions were personally delivered without first
being converted into a legal norm.  In World A, the new
norm was publicly announced whereas in World B, the
instructions were secret.  In World A, the judge was left
alone to interpret the legal norm to determine its appli-
cation in the particular case; in World B, the desired
application of the instructions was specifically directed
without any intervening judgment by the judge.  
“These three features—(1) proper procedure in mak-
ing the law, (2) publicity in announcing the norms to be
applied in the specific case, and (3) the discretionary
space for judicial interpretation of those norms—make
all the difference in whether the judge is independent or
not. In fact, the loss of any one of the three would be suf-
ficient to compromise judicial independence. . . .28
*   *   *   *
We close with two final views on judicial independence.
The first is from James Sensenbrenner, chair of the Judiciary
Committee in the United States House of Representatives.
When judges and legal-reform advocates complained that the
committee’s oversight of specific judges and decisions was
“muddying the separation of powers between Congress and
the judiciary,” Sensenbrenner responded:  “The fact that judges
have lifetime appointments gives them the independence they
need, but Congress has the responsibility to watch the judi-
ciary.”29
The last word goes to Florida Supreme Court Chief
Justice Harry Lee Anstead, who spoke for a unanimous court
in a public, in-court reprimand of Judge Carven Angel:
“Judge Angel, would you please approach the podium
and remain standing? 
“The charges filed against you arise from . . . your
admitted misconduct during your [2002] campaign for
re-election as a circuit court judge in Marion County.
[In] a stipulation, you admitted the impropriety of your
conduct. . . .30
“Each of these incidents may give to the public the
appearance that you were part of the partisan activities
involved.  This, of course, is prohibited by Canon 7 of the
Code of Judicial Ethics. . . .
“Every judicial election presents both a great opportu-
nity and a great risk.  Those elections present us with a
great opportunity to educate our citizens about the
proper role and responsibility of the Third Branch. . . .  Of
course, absolute impartiality and freedom from partisan
influences are the most important of these responsibili-
ties.
“At the same time, however, judicial elections present
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